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Abstract—In the coming years, the future of military combat 
will include, on one hand, artificial intelligence‒optimized 
complex command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and 
networks and, on the other hand, autonomous intelligent Things 
fighting autonomous intelligent Things at a fast pace. Under this 
perspective, enemy forces will seek to disable or disturb our 
autonomous Things and our complex infrastructures and systems. 
Autonomy, scale and complexity in our defense systems will 
trigger new cyber-attack strategies, and autonomous intelligent 
malware (AIM) will be part of the picture. Should these cyber-
attacks succeed while human operators remain unaware or unable 
to react fast enough due to the speed, scale or complexity of the 
mission, systems or attacks, missions would fail, our networks and 
C4ISR would be heavily disrupted, and command and control 
would be disabled. New cyber-defense doctrines and technologies 
are therefore required. Autonomous cyber defense (ACyD) is a 
new field of research and technology driven by the defense sector 
in anticipation of such threats to future military infrastructures, 
systems and operations. It will be implemented via swarms of 
autonomous intelligent cyber-defense agents (AICAs) that will 
fight AIM within our networks and systems. This paper presents 
this cyber-defense technology of the future, the current state of the 
art in this field and its main challenges. First, we review the 
rationale of the ACyD concept and its associated AICA 
technology. Then, we present the current research results from 
NATO’s IST-152 Research Task Group on the AICA Reference 
Architecture. We then develop the 12 main technological 
challenges that must be resolved in the coming years, besides 
ethical and political issues.  
Keywords—cyber defense, autonomous intelligent malware, 
autonomous cyber defense, autonomous intelligent cyber-defense 
agent, C4ISR 
I. INTRODUCTION/RATIONALE 
There are at least three good reasons to advocate the concept 
of autonomous cyber defense (ACyD): 
1. The development of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) 
and autonomous warfare operations. 
2. The growing complexity of the information and 
operations technology infrastructure that will support 
collaborative combat. 
3. The rise of autonomous intelligent malware (AIM). 
 
First, on the battlefield of the future, “intelligent Things will 
fight intelligent Things” [1].  
AWS are described as “weapon systems that, once activated, 
can select and engage targets without further human 
intervention” [2] or “machines acting more or less 
autonomously, without any direct interference from human 
operators” [3]. Whether on land, at sea or in the air, they are no 
longer fiction [4], such as drones capable of engaging in action 
either alone or in swarms, programmed “with a large number of 
alternative responses to the different challenges they may meet 
in performing their mission” (i.e., “with algorithms for countless 
human-defined courses of action to meet emerging challenges”) 
[4].  
It is difficult to predict when these technologies will become 
widespread [4]. However, on October 25, 2018, at the 
Xiangshan Forum, Zeng Yi, a senior executive at China’s third 
largest defense company, Norinco, estimated that lethal 
autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) could be “common 
place” as early as 2025 [5]. The use of LAWS in combat already 
raises the highest concerns across the international community. 
At the UN Office at Geneva, the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons Meeting of State Parties decided in 2013 
to launch a group of experts to reflect on this matter [6], and on 
12 September 2018, the European Parliament adopted a text [7] 
urging the EU and its Member States to work toward prohibiting 
LAWS. 
Besides the legal and ethical aspects of the question, AWS 
(i.e., Intelligent Battlefield Things) will be characterized by the 
following: 
 The autonomy of their individual decisions to engage 
into combat after identifying an enemy target or based on 
a request to engage in the context of  collaborative 
combat operations. 
 Their capacity to define or adjust their undertakings 
depending on the fast-paced, unpredictable, highly 
variable, complex circumstances of the battle theater and 
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the need to coordinate with other friendly effectors in 
highly tactical maneuvers. 
 The stealth of their moves and the likely absence of 
communication with a coordinating command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence (C4I). 
Regarding the second point of the rationale, the battlefield is 
a growingly complex, versatile and contested environment. 
Collaborative combat, in this context, is aimed at leveraging 
cross-systems or cross-domain synergies to gain tactical 
superiority.  
Collaborative operations will involve and coordinate toward 
a common battlefield goal of manifold communication channels 
as well as sensing, fighting and supporting effectors operating 
on the ground, in the air, at sea, in space or even in cyberspace. 
Collaborative combat will team-up humans with the combat 
platforms that will support their actions [8], [1]. It will involve 
unmanned autonomous intelligent battlefield Things, singly or 
in swarms [4], because of their greater risk tolerance, for 
instance, in overcoming adversaries’ anti-access and area-denial 
measures [9], thus increasing their capacity to break through 
enemy lines. 
Programs such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency’s (DARPA) Collaborative Operations in Denied 
Environment (CODE) [10], DARPA’s Gremlins [11] or the 
European SCAF program [12] fall under this umbrella.  
Collaborative combat will then allow new, more daring, 
more sophisticated joint maneuvers. All of which will happen at 
a faster pace, especially when considering that, as said earlier, 
intelligent Things will be meant to fight intelligent Things [1]. 
Such collaborative operations will require versatile and 
resilient communication vectors and infrastructures. This is the 
very concept of an Internet of Battlefield Things [13] and the 
current convergence of technologies such as artificial 
intelligence (AI) in conjunction with software-defined 
networks, software-defined radio, 5G networks, etc., will create 
complex systems of systems constantly adapting to demands and 
circumstances. 
The third element of the rationale is the rise of autonomous 
intelligent malware. 
Under the previous two perspectives, enemy forces will seek 
to disable or disturb our autonomous battlefield Things and our 
complex infrastructures and systems. The enemy will need to 
invent new ways of attacking our systems and infrastructures. 
We can assume that they will employ a variety of strategies.  
First, they could spread very generic, cheap malware aimed 
at disrupting easily accessible and fairly simple assets, as 
ransomware has done over the past two to three years. The extent 
of their spread, combined with numerous interdependencies 
between systems, could create widespread systemic effects and 
unpredictable consequences.  
On another hand, enemies may seek to perform in-depth 
cyber-attacks, choosing to inject AIM agents into our systems. 
Those agents will seek pathways to targets that they will identify 
themselves, in context, and for which they will devise and 
execute attacks. 
Besides targeting autonomous battlefield Things, the enemy 
may seek, for instance, to infiltrate the supply chain, whether via 
the engineering chain or maintenance contractors or staff. Pre- 
and post-mission connections to intelligent battlefield Things 
could also be eligible attack vectors. 
Finally, let’s assume that the cyber-attacks carried out in 
these contexts would be part of larger, multifaceted enemy 
strategies that could also include, for instance, electromagnetic 
attacks. Multi-vector attacks would make the defenders’ 
situation awareness more difficult in terms of the part cyber-
attacks could play in the disruption of systems and missions. 
In this triple context where intelligent Things will fight other 
intelligent Things, where the Things might stay disconnected to 
remain stealthy, where collaborating platforms may be 
connected through the future, complex Internet of Battlefield 
Things in an underlying infrastructure that could be far more 
complex than today and where the cyber-dedicated skills pool 
remains limited on the battlefield, human operators in charge of 
monitoring cybersecurity and responding to cyber-attacks will 
likely be cognitively overwhelmed by the complexity, speed and 
scale of the events at hand. 
It is also unrealistic to expect that the human warfighters 
residing on the platform, be they in a ground vehicle, an aircraft 
or a sea vessel, will have the necessary skills or time available 
to perform cyber-defense functions locally on the vehicle [14]. 
As such, current cyber-defense doctrines and technologies 
cannot match these future threats. 
Therefore, cyber defense will need to be performed by 
intelligent, autonomous software agents. The agent (or multiple 
agents per platform) will need to stealthily monitor the 
networks, detect the enemy agents while remaining concealed 
and then destroy or degrade the enemy malware. The agents will 
have to do so mostly autonomously, without support or guidance 
from a human expert [14]. 
In this context, detecting, understanding and countering 
cyber-attacks will require a fresh approach. 
II. THE AICA REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE  
AS THE INITIAL STATE OF THE ART 
ACyD is a new field of research and technology. It is driven 
by the defense sector in anticipation of threats and challenges 
related to future military infrastructures, systems and operations. 
It will be implemented via autonomous intelligent cyber-defense 
agents (AICAs) that, alone or in swarms, will fight AIM within 
our networks and systems.  
The AICA Reference Architecture [14] was developed by a 
group of scientists from 11 countries within NATO’s Science 
and Technology Organization / IST-152 Research Task Group 
(RTG) between September 2016 and September 2019. 
There are several fundamental assumptions behind this 
technology. 
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AICAs will not prevent enemy malware from penetrating 
platforms’ systems. They will be dedicated to fighting malware 
when it is already present within those platforms. 
By being embedded within future mission-critical, safety-
sensitive military effectors, systems and networks, AICAs will 
enable the latter to keep operating despite cyber-attacks in 
battlefield environments that will rely on the Internet of 
Battlefield Things, AI, 5G networks, autonomous effectors and 
vehicles, etc.  
Intelligent goodware, just like future intelligent malware, 
will take the shape of autonomous “agents”, defined as pieces of 
software or hardware with a processing unit capable of making 
smart decisions on their own about their courses of action in 
uncertain and adverse environments.  
AICAs will have five functions, to be executed individually 
or collectively in swarms: 
 monitor a perimeter of a host system they are to defend,  
 detect signs of cyber-attacks,  
 devise plans of countermeasures,  
 execute tactically such plans, and 
 report about their doings to human operators.  
Provisions should be made for AICAs to collaborate with 
one agents residing on the same host system or other computers. 
However, in many cases, because communications might be 
impaired or observed by the enemy, the agents will have to avoid 
collaboration and operate alone [14]. 
AICAs will not be simple agents. Their missions, 
competencies, functions, architecture and technology will be a 
challenging construction in many ways: in terms of engineering; 
smart decision making, both individual and collective; their own 
defense against adversary malware; and the trustworthiness of 
the technology given ethical, societal and legal implications. 
The enemy malware, its capabilities and tactics, techniques 
and procedures will evolve rapidly. Therefore, AICAs will need 
to be capable of autonomous learning [14]. 
In a military environment, any drawback that might be 
associated with the operation of AICAs will have to be balanced 
against the death or destruction caused by the enemy if the agent 
is not available [14]. 
The AICA Reference Architecture described in [14] is 
inspired from [15]. Its components are depicted in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  AICA Reference Architecture: components of agents 
AICA components include the following data services: 
 World model 
 World current state and history 
 World dynamics knowledge 
 Goals 
We hypothesize that a world model is a formal descriptor of 
the elements it supplies to the agent’s other components: 
 The nominal and degraded ontology or configuration of 
the agent 
 The nominal and degraded ontology or configuration of 
the system and environment (systems and threat) to 
defend 
 The nominal and degraded ontology or configuration of 
cyber threats against the system and environment to 
defend and against the agent itself 
 The nominal and degraded patterns of the world’s state 
(agent + environment + threat). Patterns express the 
agent, the system or its environment’s static and dynamic 
relations, and the concurrency of their configurations. 
We hypothesize that the world current state is the evaluated 
distance between the world as it is and what it should be (based, 
for instance, on set goals or standards). Pieces of information 
such as the following may be required to form world state 
vectors describing the agent’s world and that can be used by the 
world state identification component of AICA: 
 Nominal and degraded states of reference of agents and 
their cohort, defended systems, their environment and 
connections, and threats, including the current state and 
the track record of past states 
 Memory of cyber-defense actions and their impacts on 
the state of the world (current and past) 
 Current data about agents and their cohort, defended 
systems, their environment and connections, and threats 
We hypothesize that world dynamics are the following: 
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 An agent’s behavioral rules and related expected states 
(nominal and degraded) in given circumstances 
 Defended systems and other world objects’ behavioral 
rules and related expected states (nominal and degraded) 
in given circumstances 
We also hypothesize that an agent’s goals are a descriptor of 
the rules that define the mission and the limits of the action of 
the agent. 
Data services are not seen just as mere data repositories but 
as producers of processed data (i.e., “information”). It is 
assumed that AICAs would embark an intelligence of their own 
or rely on external sources to produce information, possibly in 
cooperation with other agent services.  
The agent’s data services are built in a way similar to that 
depicted in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. General architecture of AICAs’ data services 
The data services will have the following characteristics 
[14]: 
 Data collectors accept incoming data records and check 
their compliance to formatting and consistency rules.  
 Once verified, data records are processed. Processing 
may be limited to mere storage instructions or the data 
service module may have to perform data 
normalization/consolidation/aggregation functions as 
well as exploratory data analysis and exploratory factor 
analysis operations. 
 Data records and elaborated information can be 
requested by the agent’s other components. In this case, 
the data service’s request handler should be designed to 
check the request against validity and security rules 
(according to agent design options and security policies), 
and then data are extracted, sorted, grouped and bundled 
into an appropriate data container and returned to the 
requesting module. 
On those bases, AICAs will implement five main high-level 
functions [14]: 
1) Sensing and World State Identification 
2) Planning and Action Selection 
3) Collaboration and Negotiation 
4) Action Execution 
5) Learning 
Sensing and World State Identification is the AICA high-
level function that allows a cyber-defense agent to acquire data 
from the environment and systems in which it operates, as well 
as from itself, to reach an understanding of the current state of 
the world and, should it detect risks in it, trigger the Planning 
and Action Selection function. 
Planning and Action Selection allows a, AICA to elaborate 
one to several action proposals and propose them to the action 
selection function, which decides the action or set of actions to 
execute to resolve the problematic world state pattern previously 
identified by World State Identification. 
Action Execution allows an agent to effect the Action 
Selection’s decision about an executable response plan (or the 
part of a global executable response plan assigned to the agent), 
monitor its execution and its effects, and provide friendly agents 
with the means to adjust the execution of their own part of the 
response plan as and when needed. 
Collaboration and Negotiation enables a cyber-defense agent 
to 1) exchange information with other agents or a central cyber 
command and control (C2), or possibly a human operator, for 
instance, when one of the agent’s functional components is not 
capable on its own of reaching satisfactory conclusions or usable 
results; and 2) negotiate with its partners the elaboration of a 
consolidated conclusion or result. 
Learning allows an AICA to use its experience to improve 
progressively its efficiency with regard to all other functions. 
These five high-level functions will rely upon the 
components of the AICA Reference Architecture described in 
Fig. 1. 
The World State Identification component comprises the 
following: 
 May ask the sensing component for further data if it 
cannot compute the current state of the environment in 
the agent’s remit. 
 Computes how good or poor the performance of 
previously launched plans of actions is, and if poor or 
inadequate, triggers the Planning component for a 
revision/tactical adaptation of these plans to better match 
the attacker’s action. 
 Updates, when possible/appropriate, the world current 
state and history, world dynamics and world model 
databases. 
The Planning comprises the following: 
 Elaborates a number of options of action 
(countermeasure) plans in response to the current state 
identified previously. 
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 May ask the World State Identification component for a 
refinement of the computation of the current state if it 
lacks elements to elaborate a plan of countermeasures. 
The Action Selection comprises the following: 
 Evaluates and ranks (in terms for instance of cost, time 
to deliver effects, risks, etc.) the plan options presented 
by the planning component. 
 May ask the Planning component to refine its plan 
options. 
 Updates the world dynamics database when it has made 
a clear choice of a plan and associated it with the current 
state found by the World State Identification component. 
The Action Execution comprises the following: 
 Launches the orders corresponding to the plan and sends 
them to the ad hoc effectors across the system defended 
by the agent. 
 Specifies what the sensing component must monitor to 
supervise the execution of the action plan, and it stores 
those elements in the working memory to pass them on 
to the Sensing component. 
 Updates the world dynamics database with these 
complementary elements of information. 
The Learning component comprises the following: 
 Has a generic learning mechanism that reinforces itself 
with experience. 
 Learns on the fly from the data acquired and stored by 
the agent. 
 Updates the database components with new elements of 
knowledge. 
 Should trigger the ad hoc adaptations of the agent’s 
internals to improve the latter’s performance. 
AICAs could be implemented in three different ways [14], 
and each option would entail specific choices both in terms of 
technology and doctrine of use: 
1) A society of specialized agents: This option refers to the 
distributed implementation of the reference agent’s 
functional components as a group of specialized agents, 
each one owning/delivering one of the functions of 
AICA, and the sum of the agents delivering the entire 
reference agent’s cyber-defense capability.  
2) A multi-agent system: This option refers to a swarm or 
cohort of fully functional agents, the architecture of 
which would be as in the AICA model presented 
previously, each one being capable of executing all 
AICA functions, and the swarm as a whole being 
supposed to deliver a collective response to a 
cyberattack. 
3) An autonomous collaborative agent: This option refers 
to a fully functional agent, capable of performing on its 
own full cyber-defense duty on its own territory and 
capable, when and as needed and circumstances 
permitting, of communicating with other AICAs.  
Should AICAs work collectively, in a swarm, for instance, 
in terms of their coordination, these agents could be deployed 
either in a centralized or decentralized manner [14]. 
In the decentralized approach, agents would work as master 
and client agents or as a distributed network of self-organizing 
agents. In a centralized approach, the evaluation of data and 
subsequent decision making could be delegated to a master 
agent. The master agent would control the client agents and 
command them to perform actions. The client agents, which 
would be installed on subsystem hardware could be very simple 
(e.g., scripts that send data and execute commands) or they could 
be full replicas of the designated master agent that could be 
activated as needed [14]. 
Given the accumulation of requirements and assumptions in 
relation to AICAs, building them is a research challenge. 
III. TWELVE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES 
In fact, AICAs are a big leap into the future of the cyber 
defense of military systems. 
The IST-152 RTG has presented some detailed challenges 
that their development entails and made clear that the 
availability of this technology for daily military use will not 
happen before 10 to 15 years. 
Twelve broad research challenges, not mentioning the 
ethical, societal and legal ones, have be identified (Fig. 3). 
  
Fig. 3. Twelve research and technology challenges of ACyD 
There are five engineering-related challenges: 
1) Agents’ reference architecture: The AICA Reference 
Architecture, elaborated by NATO’s IST-152 RTG in 
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2016‒2019, remains today at a very preliminary stage 
of specification. 
2) Agents’ engineering and certification: The engineering 
of AICAs and multi-agent systems requires multiple 
technical and organizational choices to be made and 
must be aligned with the requirements of military 
systems’ engineering processes. Also, their 
certification and qualification/homologation will be 
complex. 
3) Testability and at-scale simulation: The AICA’s 
capacities and limitations must be systematically 
evaluated. To this end, simulation will be an 
indispensable resource. The possibility of performing 
such simulation at the scale of the networks and 
systems to defend may prove to be indispensable too. 
4) Implementation and compatibility technologies: 
AICAs will need all the functions required to confer 
their autonomy,  intelligence, capacity to analyze 
situations and make decisions, and capacity to 
cooperate with other agents within a multi-agent 
swarm or other distributed configurations. Tradeoffs 
between agents’ functional power and the computing 
power and memory resource of host agents need to be 
explored. Also, AICAs must be compatible with host 
systems’ cybersecurity features, otherwise the agents 
would be stopped or destroyed by these security 
features. 
5) Autonomous self-engineering and self-assurance: 
AICAs will be embedded into host systems that will be 
complex and/or autonomous. They will be in operation 
for variable lengths of time. They will sometimes face 
instable conditions of communication with one another 
and with a central cyber C2 and human operators. It is 
therefore necessary to confer to them a capacity to 
autonomously adapt their code, algorithms or rules to 
respond to changes in their context of operation or to 
new threats and ways to combat malware. 
There are five decision-making-related challenges: 
1) Cyber battle modeling and formal graphs: One of the 
important elements that will support the decision-
making process of the agent may be the “mental 
models”, i.e., the formal representations of the host 
systems to defend, their resources and stakes, and also 
situations and moves of tactical cyber combat between 
goodware and malware. 
2) Agents’ individual decision making: Agents’ decision-
making is a key to their trustworthiness, but decision 
making is still at a very early stage of development 
[16]. Machine learning (ML) and reinforcement 
learning are regularly advocated as a pathway to the 
future [17], but reduce decision making to a “single 
loop” one-shot process. The issue with this is that in 
cyber battles, the adversary plans many moves and 
reactions to the target’s response to their moves. In a 
tactical battle, a smart decision is one that wins the 
battle, not one that counters a single adversary move 
and risks triggering retaliation. Human decision 
making is smart because it builds on vigilance, vision, 
knowledge, experience, anticipation, wisdom, self-
monitoring, deliberation, emotion and plasticity. 
Instance-based learning theory (IBLT) shows that five 
mechanisms are at play in dynamic decision making 
[18]: instance-based knowledge, recognition-based 
retrieval, adaptive strategies, necessity-based choice 
and feedback updates. References [19] and [20] show 
that for agents, making the right decision requires the 
integration of a variety of approaches. Decision 
making in action [21] suggests that the decision-
making process’ plasticity is an adaptive response to 
circumstances’ characteristics and uncertainty. 
Allowing cyber-defense agents to make good decisions 
that show efficiency and value in the long run of cyber 
battles requires a new model of decision making. 
Research should thus explore the convergence of 
several currents of work conducted in recent years such 
as cognitive architectures [22] and their use for 
computer games [23], naturalistic decision making [24] 
and decision making in action [21] as they characterize 
the micro-cognitive processes of expert decision 
making, IBLT for dynamic decision making [18], 
agent-based modeling and simulation of cyber battles 
[25] and cyber-attack graphs and models [26, 27] seek 
to provide models of adversaries, along with game 
theory, AI and ML, and its current refinements. 
3) Collective intelligence and decision making: To bring 
some form of functional superiority over enemy 
malware in the tactical cyber combats between 
goodware and malware, swarms of AICAs will need to 
elaborate smarter decisions based on multiple 
exchanges of information, mutual help or the 
distribution of their tasks or missions. 
4) Learning, loading and sizing: Live learning within 
AICAs will rely on knowledge bases (such as the data 
services presented earlier). Such knowledge must be 
specified, the resource it requires, for instance, in terms 
of memory or processing power, must be explored. 
This function may prove to be too demanding in terms 
of resources, and offline learning and agents’ 
preloading with downsized databases are envisaged. 
Here, as for the other challenges, options must be 
explored. 
5) Cooperation with external entities: AICAs may have to 
or get opportunities to collaborate with a central cyber 
C2 system, the function of which might be to act as a 
central master vis-à-vis decentralized “slave” agents. 
They might also collaborate with human operators 
when they need help to raise their understanding of a 
situation or plan countermeasures, for instance. The 
protocols, the security and trustworthiness of these 
exchanges need to be explored. 
Two challenges relate to AICAs’ resilience: 
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1) Stealth and resilience: AICAs will be the first target of 
enemy malware. Their stealth will be a factor of 
survival for them. They will also need to be robust to 
attacks and able to resist degradation when attacked. 
Such principles will impact on the engineering of 
agents and need to be explored as well. 
2) Friend or foe? Ping, trust and social dynamics: When 
AICAs “meet” or when an unknown agent meets a 
friendly agent or signals its presence, the latter will 
need to evaluate if this is a trustworthy agent with 
which it is possible to collaborate. Social protocols and 
trust evaluation need to be specified and evaluated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
ACyD is a new current of research at the junction between 
AI (multi-agent systems, ML, deep reinforcement learning, 
etc.), naturalistic decision making, cybersecurity and computing 
science. 
The NATO IST-152 RTG has made a variety of scientific 
publications on AICAs like the following: 
• https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.10664  
• https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.07646  
• http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2057  
• https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.08657  
It is now the duty of NATO’s IST-152 RTG to define the 
conditions of the creation of an industry work group to further 
and accelerate the research and innovation efforts that ACyD 
requires.  
Defense forces, defense industries, innovative subject-
matter experts and academic research laboratories must come 
together to take an active part in this collective effort that current 
technological developments of our mission systems imply. 
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